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08034, Spain
ARTICLE HISTORY
Compiled October 30, 2019
ABSTRACT
We investigate the problem of hiring experts (motivated socially and monetarily)
from outside of the hospital(s) in e-healthcare through the lens of mechanism de-
sign with and without money. This paper presents the mechanisms that handle the
following scenarios: 1) Multiple patients and multiple experts with patients having
zero budget, 2) Single or multiple patients and multiple experts with patient(s) hav-
ing some positive budget. In this paper, for the first scenario, we have proposed
algorithms based on the theory of mechanism design without money that satisfies
several economic properties such as truthfulness, pareto optimality, and core alloca-
tion. Considering the second scenario, the truthful and budget feasible mechanisms
are proposed. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our
proposed mechanisms. The code of our proposed mechanisms is available online at:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/8lef3kzbwwwltj8/AAB_AsICQSvfdB0Wf1iY2L89a?dl=0
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1. Introduction
Over the past decades, most of the works in healthcare domain circumvent around
the question: how to effectively and efficiently schedule the healthcare resources such
as nurses, physicians, and operation theatre(s) inside the hospitals? Answering the
above coined question, substantial works have been done to schedule resources (nurses
(Berrada et al. 1996), physicians (V. Huele and Vanhoucke 2014), and operation
theatre(s) (Guerriero and Guido 2011; Chan and Chen 2016; Cardoen et al. 2010a;
Escobar-Rodriguez et al. 2014)) inside the hospitals in healthcare system. In our fu-
ture references, hospital(s), medical unit(s), and organization(s) will be used inter-
changeably. However, how to hire (to schedule) resources (expert consultants (ECs)
etc.) from outside the hospital(s) that is/are in-house for the patient(s) is mostly un-
addressed (Starren et al. 2014; Singh et al. 2015, 2018a, 2017). It is observed that, with
the prodigious growth of the communication media (say video conferencing, Internet,
smart phones etc.), it may be an usual phenomena to have the consultancies by the
experts (especially doctors) from outside the hospital(s). It is to be noted that the
doctors can provide their consultancies by being present physically at the consultancy
spot (where the patient is admitted) or virtually (using video conferencing, In-
ternet, smart phones etc.). In our case, in order to add the pervasive flavour in
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the problem, we have considered that, doctors provide consultancy by their virtual
presence also. In our future references ECs, doctors, and experts will be used inter-
changeably.
In this paper, the experts hiring problem is modelled through the robust concepts of
mechanism design with and without money.1 By zero budget, we mean that money is
not involved in any sense in the hiring market. The idea behind studying the problem
in zero budget case is to provide the expertise of the socially motivated doctors to the
community (especially downtrodden) free of cost. On the other hand, the motivation
behind investigating the problem in positive budget case is to provide experts to the
patients who are monetarily well off, and in exchange of consultancy the patients will
be charged by the experts.2
Previously, in (Singh et al. 2018a) the experts hiring problem is investigated with
the constraint that the patients will be giving strict preference ordering over all the
available experts or the subset of the available experts.3 The truthful mechanisms were
proposed for allocating the doctors to the patients4. However, a natural generalization
of the experts hiring problem in zero budget case arises when each patient need not
rank all the available or the subset of the available experts in strict ordering. Some
of those might be indifferent among certain experts, so that preference lists may have
ties. In this context, a truthful mechanism is proposed motivated by (Roughgarden
2016; Klaus et al. 2016) to cater the need of the more realistic version of the problem.
Considering the positive budget case, in (Singh et al. 2018b) the set-up with sin-
gle patient and multiple experts with the constraint that patient have some positive
budget, is considered. A non-truthful and truthful budget feasible mechanisms are pro-
posed motivated by (Singer 2012, 2010; Khuller et al. 1999) for allocating experts to a
patient. The more realistic version of the problem could be, to have multiple patients
and multiple doctors, with the constraints that (1) each of the patient has some posi-
tive budget for the purpose of having expertise from outside of the admitted hospital,
(2) the experts may have some preferred time slot (or availability time) for imparting
the consultancy. In this paper, this generalized version of the problem is investigated
and the non-truthful and truthful mechanisms are proposed motivated by (Singer 2012,
2010; Singh et al. 2018b; Khuller et al. 1999).
For further development of the paper, we denote the two cases with the parameter
α; where α = 0 denotes the zero budget case which will be referred as case 1 hence-
forth and α > 0 denotes the positive budget case which will be referred as case 2 from
now onwards. In this paper, first the experts hiring problem in zero budget case (i.e.
α = 0) is illustrated in detailed manner in section 3. Next, in section 4 the experts
hiring problem in positive budget case (i.e. α > 0) is studied.
1In this paper, the problems modelled using mechanism design with money and without money are studied
under positive budget and zero budget cases respectively.
2The work done in this paper is the extension of the preliminary versions of the papers (Singh et al.
2018a,b) appeared in 3PGCIC 2017 and AINA 2018 respectively.
3The preference ordering can be provided by considering several factors but not limited to qualification of
the experts, organization to which the experts belong, experts professional experience, and may be the feedback
from the patients etc. The difference in preference ordering comes from the fact that patients varies in above
mentioned factors.
4Technically, by truthful mechanism we mean that the mechanism in which the agents can’t gain by
misreporting their private value.
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1.1. Flow Diagram of Proposed Healthcare System
In order to have a better understanding of our proposed model we have presented the
above discussed cases with the help of a flow chart shown in Figure 1.
Start
The patient(s) is/are
admitted to the hospital(s)
Doctors are needed from out-
side the admitted hospital(s)
Is budget
available?




erence over the doctors
No Yes
Doctors are not aware
about the hiring process
Doctors are to be aware
Doctors are made aware
Doctors are hired
Stop
Figure 1. Flow diagram of our proposed system
The main contribution of this paper are:
- In this paper, the experts hiring problem has been investigated through the lens
of mechanism design with and without money.
- For both the zero and positive budget case, the non-truthful and truthful mech-
anisms are proposed for allocating the doctor(s) to the patient(s).
- The simulations are performed for comparing our proposed mechanisms with a
carefully crafted benchmark mechanisms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elucidates the related
works. Section 3 and 4 handles the hiring experts problem with zero and positive budget
cases respectively. Experimental analysis is shown in section 5. Working of our model
in real time is discussed in section 6. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2. Prior Related Works
This section contains a short description of the previous works and developments done
in the domain of healthcare. The discussions will be mainly oriented in the following
directions: (1) development and issues in the personal health information system
(HIS), that contains the detailing of the patients medical records; (2) scheduling
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elucidates the related
works. Section 3 and 4 handles the hiring experts problem with zero and positive budget
cases respectively. Experimental analysis is shown in section 5. Working of our model
in real time is discussed in section 6. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2. Prior Related Works
This section contains a short description of the previous works and developments done
in the domain of healthcare. The discussions will be mainly oriented in the following
directions: (1) development and issues in the personal health information system
(HIS), that contains the detailing of the patients medical records; (2) scheduling
of healthcare resources (such as operation theatres (OTs), physicians, nurses etc.)
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inside the hospitals; and (3) scheduling of experts mainly doctors outside the in-house
hospitals. The prior arts on scheduling the hospital resources such as operation theatres
(OTs), physicians, nurses (Berrada et al. 1996; Ko et al. 2017) etc. can be classified
into two broad categories. One addressing the scenario of scheduling the hospital
resources inside the in-house hospitals (Cardoen et al. 2010b; V. Huele and Vanhoucke
2014), with the other addressing, scheduling of experts outside the in-house hospitals
(Starren et al. 2014; Singh et al. 2015; Pottayya et al. 2017). Our paper can be
classified more in the second category. While, there are many fundamental questions
that makes this healthcare research direction quite challenging. Our work finds
relevance to some of them such as: a) which experts are to be hired? b) how to have
the expertise of the socially motivated experts for the patients (mainly downtrodden)?
c) what is to be paid to the hired experts?
• Development and Issues in HIS: In order to have an idea on the recent develop-
ments and challenges in the Health Information System (HIS) we recommend readers
to go through (Stanimirovic 2015; Marcelo 2010; Paul et al. 2012). In (Stanimirovic
2015) the effort has been made for the development of HIS that partly based on
three-level graph-based model (3LGM) and mainly based on a three-layer graph-based
meta-model (3LGM2). Further, they provide the guidelines for the cost and time
effective implementation of HISs. In Atanasovski et al. (2018), a set of models that
formalize the implementation of e-health system using Model Driven Architecture
(MDA) as a framework, is presented. The study in (Ekblaw et al. 2016) developed a
decentralized health record management system, named MedRec to handle Electronic
Health Records (EHRs) using blockchain technology. The system provided patients
with a comprehensive, immutable log and easy access to their medical information
across different providers and various treatment sites. In Rahmadika and Rhee (2018)
an architectural model for managing the Personal Health Information (PHI) data
using block-chain technology is proposed. But there are still the issues of privacy,
security, and integrity of the data in the proposed model. In order to have an overview
of blockchain technology role and challenges in healthcare we recommend readers to
go through Kumar et al. (2018). In Chiang et al. (2018), a personal health record
system is established in the cloud to have an easy access of the patients’ complete
health record and enhance medical efficiency. In this, the proposed scheme ensures
that any authorized medical personnel can obtain the decryption key only in the legal
time interval and access the data.
• In-house scheduling of healthcare resources: In (Dexter and Macario 2004; Chan
and Chen 2016; Guerriero and Guido 2011; Cardoen et al. 2010a,b; Samudra et al.
2016) the works have been done for allocating OTs on time to increase OTs efficiency.
In (Bowers et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2007; Carter and Lapiere 2001; V. Huele and Van-
houcke 2014; Erhard et al. 2018; Tang et al. 2016) the different methods of scheduling
the physicians in an emergency cases (may be critical operations) are discussed and
presented. Several companies has developed physician scheduling software (ACEP
1998; ByteBloc 1995; MSI 1998) that will help in scheduling the physicians inside
the hospital. In the series of physician scheduling literature, (Santos and Eriksson
2014) has investigated the physician scheduling problem and found that for timely
and high quality care, the other healthcare resources such as patient, non-physician
staff, room and equipment should also be scheduled and coordinated well along
with physicians. Previously studied physician scheduling approaches (Carter and
Lapiere 2001; V. Huele and Vanhoucke 2014) did not took this factor into consideration.
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• Scheduling experts outside the in-house hospitals: As with the enhancement in
the technologies, mainly communication media (say video conferencing, Internet, smart
phones etc.), it may be an usual phenomena to think of providing the expertise of the
medical staffs (mainly doctors) outside the in-house hospital by their virtual presence
(Starren et al. 2014; Kakria et al. 2015) or by physical presence (Singh et al. 2015;
Pottayya et al. 2017). Some literature works projected light, on the scarcity of health-
care facilities and non-availability of doctors in rural areas and proposed some feasible
approaches in this direction (Mukherjee and Bhunia 2014; Mukherjee et al. 2016). In
(Mukherjee and Bhunia 2014; Mukherjee et al. 2016), the efforts have been made to
provide the basic healthcare services (mainly expertise by the doctors present in ur-
ban areas) to the patients residing in the rural areas. In order to establish such type
of rural-urban consultancy arena, a remote healthcare framework has been proposed
based on sensor-cloud (sensor technology and cloud computing are meld together) tech-
nologies. As this framework is capable of storing past and present data of the patients,
so the doctors sitting remotely can access the data and provide the consultancy to
the patients. With the rapid advancement in technologies, such as mobile network and
cloud computing, a personalised and high-quality health monitoring is achieved. In Xu
et al. (2017), a framework of an m-Health monitoring system based on a cloud com-
puting platform (Cloud-MHMS) is designed to implement pervasive health monitoring.
In (Starren et al. 2014) a doctor is providing the expertise through video conferencing
to a patient admitted to other hospital with prior contact. In (Tekin et al. 2015) the
context of the patient (such as age, sex, medical report etc.) is utilized to take the
expertise of the doctors from outside the admitted hospitals in non-strategic setting.
In (Singh et al. 2015, 2018b) the strategic case is considered and is solved using mech-
anism design with money and in (Singh et al. 2018a, 2017) mechanism design without
money is utilized. For the full version of (Singh et al. 2018b) and (Singh et al. 2018a)
one can go through (Singh and Mukhopadhyay 2016b) and (Singh and Mukhopadhyay
2016a) respectively.
3. Case 1: Hiring Experts Problem with α = 0
In zero budget case, first the problem is studied under the consideration that, we have
equal number of doctors and patients say n. Each of the patient initially allocated
some in-house doctor and is providing the preference ordering (may or may not be
strict) over all the available doctors for better expertise. But, one can think of the
situation where there are n number of patients and m number of doctors such that
m 6= n (m > n or m < n). Moreover, the constraints that each of the patient initially
allocated an in-house expert is not feasible for m 6= n case. Also, the patients providing
the preference ordering over all the available doctors is not essential and can be relaxed
for all the three different set-ups (i.e. m = n, m < n, and m > n). By relaxation, we
mean that initially no in-house doctor will be assigned to patients for m 6= n set-up
and also the patients may give the preference ordering over the subset of the available
doctors not necessarily in strict sense for all the three set-up.
In this section, we have developed three algorithms motivated by (Shapley and
Scarf 1974; Roughgarden 2013, 2016; Klaus et al. 2016). Firstly, the RanPAM is given
as a naive solution of our problem, that will help to understand better, the more
robust Dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanisms i.e. TOAM and
TOAM-IComP. As an extension of TOAM the TOAM-IComP is proposed motivated
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by (Roughgarden 2016; Klaus et al. 2016) to cater the need of more realistic situations.1
It is to be noted that, along with truthfulness the TOAM-IComP satisfies two other
economic properties: pareto optimality and the core.
3.1. System Model and Problem Formulation
Our proposed model consists of n hospitals. In each hospitals several patients (or
agents) from different income groups are admitted who need expert consultation from
outside of the hospital. It is assumed that the participating patients cannot misreport
their income group, it is taken care by hospital authorities. Based on the income group
each hospitals provides one below income group (BIG) patient for the category under
consideration. The third party selects n doctors out of all available doctors based
on the quality of the doctors. In this set-up each hospital needs exactly one expert
consultant and each expert consultant can provide their service to one hospital at a
time. In our model, expert consultation may be sought for several categories of diseases
given as x = {x1, x2, . . . , xk}. The set of available expert consultants for a particular
category i ∈ {1, . . . , k} is denoted by Si = {sxi1 , sxi2 , . . . , sxin }. The set of available BIG
patients of particular category i ∈ {1, . . . , k} is denoted by Pi = {pxi1 , pxi2 , . . . , pxin }.
When ith category is mentioned, the index will be assumed as i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, otherwise























Figure 2. System model
The strict preference ordering of tth agent pxit ∈ Pi in ith category is denoted by
it over the set Si, where sxi1 it sxi2 means that in ith category, t prefers sxi1 to sxi2 .
Whereas, the ties in the preference list of tth agent pxit ∈ Pi in ith category is denoted






m means that in ith category, t prefers equally
sxi` and s
xi
m . The set of preferences of all the agents in k different categories is denoted
1The TOAM mechanism is applicable for the scenarios with m = n set-up in addition to the constraints
that (1) each patient is providing the preference over all the experts not necessarily in strict fashion, and (2)
each patient initially assigned an in-house expert. However, for the more realistic situations with m 6= n set-up
it can be seen that the initial assignments of the experts to the patients are not possible and also for both
the set-ups (m 6= n, m = n) the patients may give the preference ordering over the subset of the available
experts not necessarily in strict sense. So, for more realistic situations, implementation of TOAM may lead to
some infinite loop. In these scenarios, TOAM-IComP is a much more viable option as initial assignments and
preference over all the available experts are not required their.
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by = {1,2, . . . ,k}. Where, i is the preference of all the agents in ith category
over the doctors in Si, represented as i= {i1,i2,=i3, . . . ,in}.1 Given the preference
of the agents, our proposed mechanisms allocates one doctor to one patient. Let us
denote such an allocation vector by A = {A1,A2, . . . ,Ak}; where, each allocation
vector Ai ∈ A denotes the allocation vector of agents belongs to the ith category
denoted as Ai = {ai1, ai2, . . . , ain}; where ait ∈ Ai is a (pxit , sxij ) pair.
Example 1: For our understanding purpose, let’s say a category x3 ∈ x is selected from

















































Figure 3. (a) The patients belongs to category x3 provides the strict preference ordering over the available
doctor set S3. (b) By some arbitrary allocation rule, a doctor for each patient is selected from the preference
list of the patients (shown by dashed circle). (c) The final patient-doctor allocation pair.
The set of patient in category x3 is: P3 = {px31 , px32 , px33 } and the set of doctors
in category x3 is: S3 = {sx31 , sx32 , sx33 }. The set of preferences provided by patient set





3 ) as shown in Figure 3(a). Based on the preference ordering provided by
the patients in P3, a doctor is allocated to a patient by some arbitrary allocation rule
(detailed allocation rules are discussed later). The resultant allocation vector of an
agents are given as: A3 = {a31, a32, a33}, where a31 = (px31 , sx32 ), a32 = (px32 , sx31 ), a33 =
(px33 , s
x3
3 ). So, A3 = {(px31 , sx32 ), (px32 , sx31 ), (px33 , sx33 )} as shown in Figure 3(c).




Ti, ∀i ∈ Ti} denote the set of allocations that can be achieved by the agents in Ti
trading among themselves alone. Given an allocation a ∈ Ai, a set Ti ⊆ Pi of agents is
called a blocking coalition (for a), if there exists a u ∈ A(T ) such that ∀i ∈ T either
ui i ai or ui =i ai and at least one agent is better off i.e. for at least one j ∈ Ti we
have uj j aj .
Definition 2 (Core allocation). This property exhibits the fact that the allocation will
be free of blocking coalition. In other words it says that if any subset of agents form a
coalition and reallocates themselves via some internal reallocation, all of the members
of the coalition can’t be better off.
Definition 3 (Truthfulness or DSIC ). Let Ai = M(ii,i−i) and Âi = M(̂
i
i,i−i).
TOAM is truthful if a(i)i ii â(i)i, for all pxii ∈ Pi.
1It is to be noted that patients are rational and strategic in nature. It means that, patients may mis-report
their privately held preference list in order to gain.
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Definition 4 (Pareto optimality). An allocation Ai is pareto optimal if there exists no
allocation aij ∈ Ai such that any patient pxii ∈ aij can make themselves better off
without making other patient(s) pxik ∈ aik worse off.
3.2. Proposed Mechanisms in Zero Budget Case
3.2.1. Random Pick-Assign Mechanism (RanPAM)
To better understand the model first we propose a randomized algorithm called Ran-
PAM to assign doctors to the patients in the hospitals.1
3.2.1.1. Outline of RanPAM. Here, the central idea of the RanPAM is given.
RanPAM
For each category ci:
(1) Randomly pick a patient from the available patients list.
(2) Next, randomly pick a doctor from the selected patient’s preference list and
allocate it.
(3) Remove the patient along with the allocated doctor from the consultancy
arena.
(4) Repeat step 1-3 until all the patients does not allocated the doctors.
3.2.1.2. Detailed Random Pick-Assign Mechanism (RanPAM). The RanPAM con-
sists of two stage allocation mechanism, namely; Main and RanPAM allocation. The
idea behind the construction of theMain is to capture all the k categories present in the
system. In each iteration of the for loop in line 2-5, a call to RanPAM allocation is made.
Algorithm 1: Main (S, P, x, )
Output: A ← φ
1 begin
2 for each xi ∈ x do
3 Ai ← RanPAM allocation(Si, Pi, i)




In line 6, the final allocation A is returned. Considering the RanPAM allocation, from
line 3 it is clear that the algorithm terminates once the list of patients in xi category
becomes empty. In line 4, the rand() function returns the index of the randomly selected
patient and is stored in variable j. In line 5, the p∗ data structure holds the patient
present at the index returned in line 4. In line 6, a doctor is randomly selected from
the patient j ’s preference list and is held in s∗ data structure. Line 7 maintains the
selected patient-doctor pairs of xi category in Ai. Line 8 and 9 removes the selected
patients and selected doctors from the system. Line 10 removes the selected doctor
from the preference lists of the remaining patients. In line 11, 12 the p∗ and s∗ are set
to φ. The RanPAM allocation returns the final patient-doctor allocation pair set Ai.
1It is to be noted that RanPAM is suffering from the blocking coalition. This leads to the violation of one
of the economic properties in zero budget environment named as core allocation.
8
Algorithm 2: RanPAM allocation (Si, Pi, i)
Output: Ai ← φ
1 begin
2 j ← 0, p∗ ← φ, s∗ ← φ
3 while Pi 6= φ do
4 j ← rand(Pi)
5 p∗ ← pxij
6 s∗ ← random(ij)
7 Ai ← Ai ∪ (p∗, s∗)
8 Pi ← Pi \ p∗
9 Si ← Si \ s∗
10 ik ← ik \ s∗, ∀k ∈ Pi
11 p∗ ← φ




Example 2: Let’s give a closer look with the help of illustrative example that RanPAM
is suffering from blocking coalition. For an instance, let the category of all the patients
and doctors be x3 ∈ x. The set of patient is given as: P3 = {px31 , px32 , px33 }. The set of
available doctors in the selected category i.e. x3 is given as: S3 = {sx31 , sx32 , sx33 }. The
strict preference ordering revealed by the patient set P3 is shown in Figure 4(a). In
the first iteration of the while loop, let px32 be the patient selected randomly. Now, by
the construction of mechanism, the mechanism randomly selects doctor sx32 from the









































Figure 4. (a) The patients belongs to category x3 provides the strict preference ordering over the available
doctor set S3. (b) By RanPAM, a doctor for each patient is selected from the preference list of the patients
(shown by dashed circle). (c) The final patient-doctor allocation pair.
At the end of first iteration of while loop, the mechanism results in (px32 , s
x3
2 ) pair.
Similarly, in the next iteration of while loop, a patient px33 is selected. The RanPAM
selects sx31 from the p
x3
3 preference list. Finally, p
x3
1 allocated a doctor s
x3
3 from pref-
erence list. The final allocation done by the RanPAM is shown in Figure 4(b). It can
be seen from the preference list of px31 and p
x3
2 , that both the agents do not get their
best doctor from the available list of doctors. The most preferred doctor by px31 i.e.
sx32 is allocated to the agent p
x3










2 can reallocate their current
allocated doctor among themselves to make themselves better-off. The final alloca-
tion of patient− doctor pair after reallocation among px31 and px32 (forming a blocking
coalition) is shown in Figure 4(c).
Upper Bound Analysis: The time taken by the RanPAM is the sum of running times
for each statement executed. Mathematically, the upper bound on the RanPAM for all























































3.2.2. Truthful Optimal Allocation Mechanism (TOAM)
The proposed truthful mechanism needs to overcome several non-trivial challenges:
firstly, the patients preferences are unknown and need to be reported in a truthful
manner; secondly, the allocation of doctors made to the patients must satisfy the core.
The previously discussed RanPAM mechanism failed to handle such challenges. To
overcome these challenges, in this paper a truthful mechanism is proposed which is
termed as TOAM. Along with, truthfulness, TOAM satisfies pareto optimality. The
main idea of the TOAM is to develop a mechanism where the agents can’t gain by
manipulation. If there is no manipulation we can reach to the equilibrium of the system
very quickly and the market become stable.
3.2.2.1. Outline of TOAM. In this section, the central idea of the TOAM is given.
TOAM
For each category ci:
(1) First, randomly assign a doctor to each of the available patients.
(2) For each patient, point to the most preferred doctors from his/her preference
ordering among the available one.
(3) Step 1 and 2 will result in a directed graph. Determine the directed cycle in
the graph.
(4) Allocate the doctors to the patients following the directed cycle in the graph.
(5) Remove the patients along with the allocated doctors from the consultancy
arena.
(6) Repeat step 2-5 until all the patients does not get the doctors.
3.2.2.2. Detailed Truthful Optimal Allocation Mechanism (TOAM). It is a four stage
mechanism: Main routine, Graph initialization, Graph creation and Optimal allocation.
Main routine: The main idea behind the construction of main routine is to capture
all the k categories present in the system. The input to the main routine are the set
of sets of vertices representing all the available patients given as C = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck};
where Ci = {cxi1 , cxi2 , . . . , cxin } is the set of vertices representing patients belonging to
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xi category, the set of sets of vertices representing all the available expert consultants
(doctors) given as Q = {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qk}; where Qi = {qxi1 , qxi2 , . . . , qxin } is the set of
vertices representing doctors belonging to xi category, x represents the set of categories,
and the preference lists of all the patients. The output is the allocation set A.
Algorithm 3: Main routine (C, Q, x, )
Output: A ← φ
1 begin
2 Q∗ ← φ, C∗ ← φ
3 for each xi ∈ x do
4 C∗ ← select(C)
5 Q∗ ← select(Q)
6 Ai ← Graph initialization (C∗, Q∗, i)




In Line 4, the C∗ data structure temporarily holds the set of vertices returned by
select() in xi category. The Q∗ data structure temporarily holds the set of vertices
returned by select() in xi category as depicted in line 5. In line 6 for each category xi,
a call to graph initialization is made to randomly allocate a doctor to each patient.
The allocation set A maintains the allocation for each category in line 7. In line 9, the
final allocation set A is returned.
Graph initialization: The input to the graph initialization phase are the set of ver-
tices representing the patients in xi category, the set of vertices representing the
doctors in xi category, and the preference profile of the patients in xi category.
The output of the graph initialization is the graph G in the form of adjacency ma-
trix F representing the randomly allocated doctors to the patients. Line 2, initial-
izes the adjacency matrix F of size |Vi| ∗ |Vi| to null matrix; where Vi = Ci ∪ Qi.
Algorithm 4: Graph initialization (Ci, Qi, i)
1 begin
2 F = {0}|Vi|∗|Vi|
3 for each vertex cxit ∈ Ci do
4 q∗ ← Select_random(Qi)
5 Fq∗,cxit = 1
6 Qi ← Qi \ q∗
7 end
8 Graph creation (Ci, Qi, F , i)
9 end
The for loop in line 3 iterates over all the patients in the xi category. In line 4, the
Select_random() function takes the set of vertices Qi (analogous to the doctors with xi
expertise area) as the input and returns the randomly selected vertex. The randomly
selected vertex is held in q∗ data structure. Line 5, places a directed edge from q∗ to
cxit . Line 6, removes the randomly allocated vertex held in q∗ from Qi. In line 8, a call
to Graph creation phase is done.
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Graph creation: The input to the graph creation phase are the set of vertices rep-
resenting the patients in xi category, the set of vertices representing the doc-
tors in xi category, the adjacency matrix F , and the preference profile of the pa-
tients in xi category. The output of the graph creation is the adjacency matrix F .
Algorithm 5: Graph creation (Ci, Qi, F , i)
1 begin
2 for each vertex cxit ∈ Ci do
3 q∗ ← Select_best(it)
4 Fcxit ,q∗ = 1
5 end
6 Optimal allocation (F , S)
7 end
In line 3, the Select_best() function takes the strict preference ordering list of tth
agent as input and returns the best doctor from the available preference list. The q∗
data structure holds the best selected doctor. Line 4 places a directed edge from cxit ∈ Ci
to q∗ ∈ Qi. In line 6, a call to Optimal allocation phase is done.
Optimal allocation: Next target is to determine a finite cycle in a directed graph G.
Algorithm 6: Optimal allocation (F , S)
1 π ← φ, Ĉ∗ ← φ, Q̂∗ ← φ
2 foreach vi ∈ V do
3 Mark vi ← unvisited
4 end
5 π ← random(vi ∈ V)
6 Mark π ← visited
7 push(S, π)
8 while S is non-empty do
9 π ← pop(S)
10 foreach π′ adjacent to π do
11 if π′ is unvisited then
12 Mark π′ ← visited
13 push(S, π′)
14 end
15 else if π′ is visited then




20 Allocate each vi ∈ C∗ in cycle the doctors it points in Q∗
21 forall vi ∈ C∗ in the cycle do
22 Ĉ∗ ← Ĉ∗ ∪ vi
23 end
24 forall vi ∈ Q∗ in the cycle do
25 Q̂∗ ← Q̂∗ ∪ vi
26 end
27 C∗ ← C∗ \ Ĉ∗; Q∗ ← Q∗ \ Q̂∗ // Deletes the allocated patient and doctor nodes.
28 V = Q∗ ∪ C∗
29 if C∗ 6= φ or Q∗ 6= φ then
30 Graph creation (C∗, Q∗, F , )
31 end
The input to the Optimal allocation mechanism is the adjacency matrix F returned
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from the previous stage and an empty stack S. Initially, all vi ∈ V are marked unvis-
ited. Random vertex vi ∈ V is selected and after marking that vi as visited is pushed
into the stack. Line 10 − 18, computes a finite directed cycle in the graph G = (V, E)
by following the outgoing arcs, until a vertex vi ∈ V gets repeated. Line 20, reallocates
as suggested by directed cycle. Each patient on a directed cycle gets the expert con-
sultant better than the expert consultant it initially points to or the initially pointed
expert consultant. Line 21− 26 keeps track of allocated patients and doctors. Line 27
deletes the patient nodes and the expert consultant nodes from the graph G that were
reallocated in the previous step. A call is made to the graph creation phase to generate
the updated graph from the available number of patients and the expert consultants
until the patients set and doctor sets are not empty captured by line 29− 31.



























































































Figure 5. Detailed illustration of TOAM mechanism
The number of patients is n = 5 and the number of expert consultant (or doctors)
is n = 5. The strict preference ordering given by the patient set P2 is shown in Fig-
ure 5(a). Following the graph initialization phase a directed edge is placed between
the following pairs: {(sx21 , px21 ), (sx22 , px22 ), (sx23 , px23 ), (sx24 , px24 ), and(sx25 , px25 )}. Now, the
graph initialization phase calls the graph creation phase. Following the graph creation
phase, say, a patient px21 is selected from P2. As, sx22 is the most preferred doctor in




2 as shown in
Figure 5(b). The for loop of the graph creation phase places a directed edge between
the remaining patients in P2 and doctors in S2, resulting in a graph shown in Figure
5(b). Now, running the optimal allocation phase on the directed graph shown in Figure








2 ) is formed and allocation is done accordingly. Sim-
ilarly, the remaining patients P2 = {px21 , px24 , px25 } will be allocated a doctor as shown
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in Figure 5(c). The final allocation of patient− doctor pair is shown in Figure 5(d).
Proposition 1. The Top Trading Cycle Algorithm (TTCA) is DSIC (Gale and Shapley
1962; Shapley and Scarf 1974; Roughgarden 2013; Schummer and Vohra 2007).
Proposition 2. The Top Trading Cycle Algorithm (TTCA) results in unique core allo-
cation (Gale and Shapley 1962; Shapley and Scarf 1974; Roughgarden 2013; Schummer
and Vohra 2007).
3.2.2.3. Several properties of TOAM. The proposed TOAM has several compelling
properties. These properties are discussed next.
• Computationally Efficient The running time of TOAM will be the sum of the
running time of main routine, graph initialization, graph creation, and optimal
allocation phases. Line 2 of the main routine is bounded by O(1). The for loop in line
3 executes for k + 1 times. Line 4-7 are bounded by O(1) for each iteration of the for
loop. Line 6, takes the time equal to the time taken by graph initialize mechanism.
For the time being, let the graph initialization mechanism is bounded by O(N). Line
9 of main routine mechanism takes O(1) time. So, the running time of main routine is
bounded by: O(1) +O(kN) +O(1) = O(kN). In graph initialization, in each execution
of the for loop an edge is placed between the two vertices of the graph G. Generating
a partial directed graph G using line 3 − 7 takes O(n) time. Next, line 8 is bounded
by the time taken by the graph creation mechanism. In the graph creation algorithm,
the for loop contributes the major part of the running time i.e. O(n). Line 6 of graph
creation is bounded by the time taken by optimal allocation. For the time being
let the time taken by by the optimal allocation be O(M). So, the running time of
graph creation algorithm is bounded by: O(1) +O(n) +O(M). In, optimal allocation
algorithm line 3 is bounded by O(1). The total number of vertex is n + n = 2n, so
the outer for loop will take O(n). Line 5 − 7, is bounded by O(1). the total number
iterations of the innermost while loop of optimal allocation cannot exceed the number
of edges in G, and thus the size of S cannot exceed n. The while loop of optimal
allocation algorithm is bounded by O(n). Line 21 − 28 of the mechanism can be
executed in worst case O(n2). Line 30 in worst case is bounded by O(n). The running
time of optimal allocation is: O(n) + O(1) + O(n) + O(1) + O(n2) + O(n) = O(n2).
Total running time of TOAM: O(n) + O(n2) = O(n2). Considering the k categories
simultaneously we have O(kn2).
• DSIC The second property, that distinguishes the proposed TOAM from any
direct revelation allocation mechanism is its DSIC property. In TOAM, the strict
preference ordering revealed by the agents in any category xi ∈ x over the set of
doctors Si are unknown or private to the agents. As the strict preference ordering
is private, any agent i belonging to category xj ∈ x can misreport their private
information to make themselves better off. TOAM, an obvious direct revelation
mechanism claims that agents in any category i ∈ 1 . . . k cannot make themselves
better off by misreporting their private valuation, i.e. TOAM is DSIC.
Theorem 1. The TOAM is DSIC.
Proof. The truthfulness of the TOAM is based on the fact that each agent i gets the
best possible choice from the reported strict preference, irrespective of the category
i ∈ 1 . . . k of the agent i. It is to be noted that, the third party (or the platform)
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partition the available patients and doctors into different sets based on their category.
The partitioning of doctors set S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sk} is independent of the partitioning
of the available patients into the set P = {P1,P2, . . . ,Pk}. So, if we select the patient
set Pi ∈ P and the doctor set Si ∈ S randomly from category xi ∈ x and show that for
any agent pxii ∈ Pi misreporting the private information (in this case strict preference
over Si) will not make the agent pxii better-off, then its done. Our claim is that, if
any agent belonging to xi category, cannot be better off by misreporting their strict
preference, then no agent from any category can be better off by misreporting the strict
preference.
Fix category xi. Let us assume that, if all the agents in xi are reporting truthfully,
then all the agents gets a doctor till the end of mth iteration. From the construction of
the mechanism in each iteration of the TOAM, at least a cycle Ωi ∈ Ω is selected. The
set of cycles chosen by the TOAM in m iterations are: Ω = (Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,Ωm), where Ωi
is the cycle chosen by the TOAM in the ith iteration, when agents reporting truthfully.
Each agent in Ω1, gets its first choice and hence no strategic agent can be benefited
by misreporting. From the construction of the mechanism, no agent in Ωi will ever be
pointed by any agents in Ω1, . . . ,Ωi−1; if this is not the case, then agent i could have
been belong to one of the previously selected cycle.
Once the doctor is allocated to the agent, the mechanism remove the agent along with
the allocated doctor, and the strict preference list of the remaining agents are updated.
Since, agent i gets its first choice outside of the doctors allocated in Ω1, . . . ,Ωi−1, it
has no incentive to misreport. Thus, whatever agent i reports, agent i will not receive a
doctor owned by an agent in Ω1, . . . ,Ωi−1. Since, the TOAM gives agent i its favourite
doctor outside the selected cycle till now. Hence, agent i did not gain by misreporting
the strict preference ordering. From our claim it must be true for any agents in any
category i ∈ 1 . . . k. Hence, TOAM is DSIC.
• Core Allocation The third property exhibited by the proposed TOAM is related
to the uniqueness of the resultant allocation or in some sense optimality. The term
used to determine the optimal allocation of TOAM is termed as unique core allocation.
The claim is that, the allocation computed by the proposed TOAM is the unique core
allocation.
Theorem 2. The allocation computed by TOAM is the unique core allocation.
Proof. The proof of unique core allocation for any category xi ∈ x can be thought of
as divided into two parts. First, it is proved that the allocation vector Ai computed
by TOAM for any category xi ∈ x is a core allocation. Once the allocation vector in xi
category is proved to be The core, the uniqueness of the core allocation for xi is taken
into consideration. Our claim is that, if the allocation Ai computed by TOAM for any
arbitrary xi ∈ x is a unique core allocation, then the allocation computed by TOAM
for all xi ∈ x will be a unique core allocation.
Fix category xi. In order to prove the allocation computed by TOAM is a core
allocation, consider an arbitrary sets of agents S∗, such that S∗ ⊆ P . Let Ωi is the
cycle chosen by TOAM in the ith iteration and δ(Ωi) is the set of agents allocated a
doctor, when reporting truthfully. When TOAM will allocate the agents, at some cycle
Ωk, i ∈ S∗ will be included for the first time. In that case δ(Ωk)∩S∗ 6= φ. As any agent
i ∈ S∗ is being included for the first time, it can be said that no other agent in S∗ is
included in the cycles Ω1, . . . ,Ωk−1. As the TOAM allocates the favourite doctor to
any arbitrary agent i ∈ δ(Ωk) outside the doctors allocated to δ(Ω1), . . . , δ(Ωk−1), it
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can be concluded that i ∈ δ(Ωk) and i ∈ S∗ such that δ(Ωk)∩S∗ 6= φ gets his favourite
doctor at the kth iteration. Hence no internal reallocation can provide a better doctor
to any agent i ∈ S∗. Inductively, the same is true for any agent j ∈ S∗ that will satisfy
δ(Ωk) ∩ S∗ 6= φ.
Now, we prove uniqueness. In TOAM, each agent in Ω1 receives the best possible doctor
from his preference list. Any core allocation must also do the same thing, otherwise
the agents who didn’t get the first choice could be better off with internal reallocation.
So the core allocation agrees with the TOAM allocation for the agents in δ(Ω1). Now
in TOAM, as all the agents in δ(Ω2) get their favourite doctors outside the set of
doctors allocated to the agents δ(Ω1), any core allocation must be doing the same
allocation, otherwise the agents in δ(Ω2) who didn’t get their favourite choice can
internally reallocate themselves in a better way. In this way we can inductively conclude
that the core allocation must follow the TOAM allocation. This proves the uniqueness
of TOAM.
Hence, it is proved that the allocation by TOAM for category xi is a unique core
allocation. From our claim it must be true for any agents in categories i . . . k. Hence,the
allocation computed by TOAM for any category xi ∈ x is the unique core allocation.
3.2.2.4. Correctness of the TOAM:. The correctness of the TOAM mechanism is
proved with the loop invariant technique (Cormen et al. 2009; Gries 1987). The loop
invariant : At the start of jth iteration, the number of patient-doctor pairs to be ex-
plored are n −∑j−1i=1 ki in a category, where ki is the number of patient-doctor pairs
processed at the ith iteration. Precisely, it is to be noted that n−∑j−1i=1 ki ≤ n. From
definition of ki, it is clear that the term ki is non-negative. The number of patient-
doctor pairs could be atleast 0. Hence, satisfying the inequality n−∑j−1i=1 ki ≤ n. We
must show three things for this loop invariant to be true.
• Initialization: It is true prior to the first iteration of the loop. Just before the first iter-
ation of the while loop, in optimal allocation mechanism n−∑j−1i=1 ki ≤ n⇒ n−0 ≤ n
i.e. no patient-doctor pair is explored apriori in, say ith category. This confirms that
Ai contains no patient-doctor pair.
• Maintenance: For the loop invariant to be true, if it is true before each iteration of
while loop, it remains true before the next iteration. The body of while loop allocates
doctor(s) to the patient(s) with each doctor is allocated to one patient present in the
detected cycle; i.e. each time Ai is incremented or each time n is decremented by ki.
Just before the jth iteration the number of patient-doctor pairs allocated are
∑j−1
i=1 ki,
implies that the number of patient-doctor pairs left are: n −∑j−1i=1 ki ≤ n. After the
jth iteration, two cases may arise:
Case 1: If kj = n −
∑j−1
i=1 ki: In this case, all the kj patient-doctor pairs will be ex-
hausted in the jth iteration and no patient-doctor pair is left for the next iteration. The
inequality n− (∑j−1i=1 ki + kj) = (n−∑j−1i=1 ki)− kj = (n−∑j−1i=1 ki) − (n−∑j−1i=1 ki)
= 0 ≤ n.
Case 2: If kj < n−
∑j−1
i=1 ki: In this case, j
th iteration allocates few patient-doctor pairs
from the remaining patient-doctor pairs; leaving behind some of the pairs for further
iterations. So, the inequality n− (∑j−1i=1 ki + kj) ≤ n = n−∑ji=1 ki ≤ n is satisfied.
From Case 1 and Case 2, at the end of jth iteration the loop invariant is satisfied.
• Termination: In each iteration at least one patient-doctor pair is formed. This in-
dicates that at some (j + 1)th iteration the loop terminates and in line no. 8, S is
exhausted, otherwise the loop would have continued. As the loop terminates and S is
exhausted in (j + 1)th iteration. We can say n−∑ji=1 ki = 0 ≤ n. This indicates that
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all the agents are processed and each one has a doctor assigned when loop terminates.
3.2.3. Truthful Optimal Allocation Mechanism for InComplete Preference
(TOAM-IComP)
3.2.3.1. Outline of TOAM-IComP. The central idea of the TOAM-IComP is given.
TOAM-IComP
For each category ci:
(1) First, the n distinct random numbers are generated and assigned to patients.
(2) Next, based on the random number assigned, each time a patient is picked
up from the patient list and a check is made, whether the preference list of
the selected patient is empty or not;
• If not, then allocate the most preferred doctor to the patient from
his/her preference ordering among the available one. Remove the pa-
tient along with the allocated doctor from the consultancy arena.
• Otherwise, remove the unallocated patient from the consultancy arena.
(3) Repeat step 2 until the patient list becomes empty.
3.2.3.2. Detailed TOAM-IComP. The input to the TOAM-IComP are: the set of n
Algorithm 7: TOAM-IComP (Si, Pi, i)
1 begin
2 ` ← 0, p̂ ← φ, ŝ ← φ, B ← φ
3 for i = 1 to n do
4 B ← B ∪ {i}
5 end
6 for i = 1 to n do
7 swap B[i] with B[Random(i, n)]
8 end
9 for each pxij ∈ Pi do
10 Assign(pxij ,B[`])
11 `← `+ 1
12 end
13 Pi ← Sort(Pi, B) // Sort Pi based on random number generated.
14 while Pi 6= φ do
15 p̂ ← pick(Pi) // Picks the patients based on the random number assigned.
/* where, j = 1, 2, . . . , n */
16 if ij 6= φ then
17 ŝ ← Select_best(ij)
18 F ← F ∪ (p̂, ŝ)
19 Pi ← Pi \ p̂
20 Si ← Si \ ŝ
21 end





available patients in a particular category xi, the set of m available doctors in a
particular category xi, and the set of preferences of all the patients for the available
doctors in a xi category. The output of the TOAM-IComP is the allocated patient-
doctor pairs. In line 2, all the variables and data structures are initialized to 0 and φ
respectively. In line 3-5 numbers 1 to n are captured in B data structure. Next, the
generated list B is randomized using line 6-8. Line 9-12 assigns the distinct random
numbers between 1 and n stored in B to the patients sequentially. In line 13, the
patient list Pi is sorted based on the assigned random numbers. From line 14, it is clear
that the mechanism terminates, once the patient list becomes empty. In line 15, using
pick() function, patient is selected sequentially based on the number assigned. Line 16
checks the preference list of patient stored in p̂. In line 17, the best available doctor
is selected from the selected patient preference list by using Select_best() function.
Line 18 maintains the selected patient-doctor pairs in F data structure. Line 19 and
20 removes the selected patients and selected doctors from their respective preference
lists. Line 22 sets p̂ and ŝ to φ. The TOAM-IComP returns the final patient-doctor
pair allocation set F .
3.2.3.3. Upper Bound Analysis. The random number generator in line 3-12 is moti-
vated by (Cormen et al. 2009) and is bounded above by n. When a while loop exits in
the usual way (i.e., due to the inner loop header), the test is executed one time more
than the body of the while loop. In line 14, the test is executed (n+ 1) times, as their
are n patients in Pi. In line 13, the sorting is done that is bounded above by n lg n.
































































































Proposition 3. The Draw is DSIC (Roughgarden 2016).
Proposition 4. The outcome of The Draw is Pareto optimal (Roughgarden 2016).
Theorem 3. The TOAM-IComP is DSIC.
Proof. Fix a category xi. It is to be noted that, in TOAM-IComP the random numbers
generated for the patients are independent of the preference list submitted by the
patients. It means that, in which iteration of TOAM-IComP a patient is considered,
is independent of his/her submitted preference list. From the construction of TOAM-
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IComP, when a patient is considered he/she (henceforth he) will be getting his best
doctor among the available doctors from his preference list. So, if any patient revealing
the preference list other than the true preference list, then he will ends up getting the
doctor worse than the doctor he will get while revealing the true preference list. From
above argument it can be concluded that, it does not make any sense for the patients
to mis-report their true preference list. From our claim it must be true for any agents
in any category i ∈ 1 . . . k. Hence, TOAM-IComP is DSIC.
Similar argument can be given for the scenario when the patients have ties between
the doctors in their respective preference list.
Theorem 4. The outcome of TOAM-IComP is Pareto optimal.
Proof. Fix a category xi. It can be seen from the construction of TOAM-IComP that
at any kth iteration, the patient under consideration gets the best doctor among the
available doctors. As a thought experiment, let’s run the TOAM-IComP and some
"unknown mechanism" parallelly. The idea is to show that the allocation resulted by
"unknown mechanism" is similar to that of TOAM-IComP, if not then in the allocation
resulted by "unknown mechanism" some patients have been worsen off. So, this makes
the TOAM-IComP Pareto optimal.
We will take the help of method of induction to prove the above claim.
Base case: Before the 1st iteration i.e. in 0th iteration the allocation by the two mech-
anisms are same i.e. empty set.
Inductive step: Let us say till `th iteration the two mechanisms results in same patient-
doctor pairs. Thus, for the (`+1)th iteration the set of available doctors for the remain-
ing patients will be similar for both the mechanisms. At this point, in TOAM-IComP
any patient i considered will be getting the best possible doctor among the available
doctors. But say with the same set of available doctors the "unknown mechanism"
allocates the doctor other than allocated by the TOAM-IComP to patient i, then it
is for sure that patient i is worsen off. If not, then both the mechanism would have
resulted in same set of allocations, which is optimal. Hence, TOAM-IComP result in
an outcome that is Pareto optimal.
From our claim it must be true for any patient in categories i . . . k. Hence, the outcome
computed by TOAM-IComP for any category xi ∈ x is the Pareto optimal. Similar ar-
gument can be given for the scenario when the patients have ties between the doctors
in their respective preference list.
Theorem 5. The allocation computed by TOAM-IComP is the unique core allocation.
Proof. Fix a category xi. It can be seen easily that TOAM-IComP results in a unique
allocation. Now, talking about the resulted unique allocation to be "The Core". Let
us say the two patients; patient i and j forms a coalition and reports their preference
list by mutual collaboration (preference list other than their true preference list). As
the random number assigned to the patients is independent of the preference lists
reported by the patients. So, if at any particular time any of the patient i and j
is considered, they will be allocated best doctor from the available doctors in their
respective preference list. But, by mutual collaboration if they have manipulated their
respective preference list then they will be getting either the allocation that they would
have got if they haven’t manipulated the list or the worse. It means that, by mutual
interaction the patients can’t gain. So, TOAM-IComP results in core allocation. From
our claim it must be true for any agents in any category i ∈ 1 . . . k. Hence, TOAM-
IComP results in unique core allocation.
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Table 1. Running time and Economic properties of the proposed mechanisms
Economic properties
Proposed mechanisms Running time The Core Truthfulness Pareto optimality
RanPAM O(kn) 7 7 7
TOAM O(kn2) 3 3 3
TOAM-IComP O(kn2) 3 3 3
Similar argument can be given for the scenario when the patients have ties between
the doctors in their respective preference list.
Example 4: The detailed functioning of TOAM-IComP for category x3 is illustrated
in Figure 6. The number of patients is n = 4 and the number of expert consultants (or
doctors) ism = 3. The strict preference ordering given by the patient set P3 is shown in
Figure 6. Following line 3-12 of Algorithm 7, we generate the random numbers for the
patients in P3. Now, based on the random number assigned as shown in Figure 6(a),
first the patient px33 is selected and assigned expert consultant s
x3
1 from his preference
list. Similarly, the remaining patients px31 , p
x3
4 , and p
x3
2 are selected in the presented
order and assigned the doctors sx32 , s
x3
3 , and none respectively. The final allocation of































Figure 6. Detailed functioning of TOAM-IComP
4. Case 2: Hiring Experts Problem with α > 0
In this section, the more realistic scenario of the doctors hiring problem is investi-
gated, where unlike the zero budget case the patients are having some positive budget
for the consultancy purpose. In positive budget case, first the more relaxed version
of the problem is studied with a patient having some positive budget admitted to a
hospital. The goal is to assign the set of experts to a patient so that the total payment
made to the experts are within patient’s budget. In the more general version, we have
considered the case where there are multiple patients admitted to different hospitals
and each patient is having some positive budget. On the other side of the market there
are multiple doctors. The goal is to allocate the doctors to the patients so that the
total payment made to the hired doctors are within patient’s individual budget. It is
to be noted that, the problem is studied under the consideration that doctors are not
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aware about the hiring concept.
In this section we have developed mechanisms: Non-truthful budget constraint
(NoTBC) mechanism motivated by (Khuller et al. 1999), and Truthful budget
constraint (TBC) mechanism motivated by (Singer 2012, 2010).
4.1. System Model and Problem Formulation
In this section, we formalize the doctors hiring problem where the multiple doctors
are hired from outside of the hospital, for a patient having budget B′. The patient’s
budget B′ is a public information. The hospital to which a patient is admitted is having
an accumulated, publicly known budget B, which will be utilized to inform about the




























































Figure 7. System model
The set of ECs is given as S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm}; where each EC si ∈ S is assumed to
be professionally connected with some χi ⊆ S\{si}. The professional connections are
given by a social graph G(V, E), where V is the set of nodes representing ECs and E is
the set of edges representing their professional connections in the social graph. Each
si is associated with a hospital ~i ∈H.
Our model consists of two fold process. In the first fold, there is a social graph
that is represented as G(V, E) and publicly known expert consultant activation function
given as I : 2S →R≥0. Given the subset Γ ⊆ S the value I(Γ ) represents the expected
number of doctors that are made aware about the hiring concept i.e. I(Γ ) = | ⋃
i∈Γ
χi|.
Each node in the graph represents a doctor si that has a private cost (aka bid) ci of
being an initial adapter or the cost for spreading awareness about the hiring concept
to other doctors. The cost vector of all the m doctors is given as: C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}.
It is to be noted that, the ECs are rational and strategic in nature. It means
that, the ECs can gain by misreporting their private cost. As the ECs are strategic;
so each si ∈ S may report their cost for being an initial adapter as c′i instead of ci
in order to gain; where c′i 6= ci. The payment vector for the set Γ is given as PΓ =
{PΓ1 ,PΓ2 , . . . ,PΓk}; where PΓi is the payment of si ∈ Γ . The objective of the first
fold is to maximize the expert consultant activation function while the total payment
is at most hospital’s budget B.
In the second fold, we have a set of doctors consisting of doctors acted as leaders
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in the first fold and the aware doctors given as Ŝ = {s1, s2, . . . , si−1, si, . . . , sn} such
that n ≤ m. The quality vector of all the m ECs is given as Q = {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qm},
where Qi ∈ Q is the quality of ith doctor. In general, the quality Qi of a doctor si
can be estimated using various parameters calculated later in the section. The publicly
known quality function is given as D : 2Ŝ → R≥0. Given a subset Υ ⊆ Ŝ, the value
D(Υ ) denotes the sum of the qualities of all the doctors in Υ i.e. D(Υ ) =
∑
i∈Υ Qi.
For this fold, each doctor si ∈ Ŝ will bid afresh their cost (private) for providing
consultancy to the patient and is given as c̄i. The cost vector of all the n doctors is given
as: C̄ = {c̄1, c̄2, . . . , c̄n}. The strategic behaviour of the doctors is continued in this
fold also; so each si ∈ Ŝ may report their cost of consultancy as c̄′i instead of c̄i in order
to gain; where c̄′i 6= c̄i. Our objective is to determine the subset Υ ∈ {ξ|
∑
i∈ξ c̄i ≤ B′}
for which D(Υ ) is maximized and the total payment should not exceed the patient’s
budget B′. The payment vector of the set Υ is given as P̂ = {P̂1, P̂2, . . . , P̂r}.
4.1.1. Quality Determination
The parameters that determine the quality of each doctor si are: (1) qualification
of si given as qi (2) success rate of si given as sri (3) experience of si given as
ei (4) hospital to which si belong given as ~i. So, the quality of doctor si is given
as: Qi = (w1 · qi + w2 · sri + w3 · ei + w4 · ~i); where, wi ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
iwi = 1.
The weighted sum of the some of the parameters considered in our case will result in
the quality of the doctors.
4.1.2. Budget Distribution and Utilization
In our scenario, each fold is utilizing the budget from two independent sources. Firstly,
talking about the hospital’s budget it can be thought of as 1) the accumulated fund
from the previously admitted patients say adding 5-6% of the total fees of each patients
to the hospital fund. 2) Donation to the hospital by high profile persons or communities.
Next, the source of the budget utilized in the second phase is the patient itself.
Definition 5 (Marginal contribution (Singer 2012)). The marginal contribution of an
EC si ∈ S is the number of ECs informed about the hiring concept by the EC si
given the set of i − 1 ECs i.e. Γi−1 already selected as the leaders. Mathematically,
the marginal contribution of ith EC given Γi−1 is defined as: MCi(Γi−1) = I(Γi−1 ∪
{si})− I(Γi−1)
Definition 6 (Quality contribution (Singer 2010)). The quality contribution of an EC
si ∈ S given a subset Υi−1 of ECs already been selected is given as: Di(Υi−1) =
D(Υi−1 ∪ {si}) − D(Υi−1) where D(Υi) denotes the sum of the qualities of all the
doctors in Υi i.e. D(Υi) =
∑
iQi given Υi = {1, . . . , i} and D(Υ0) = 0 as Υ0 = φ.
4.2. Proposed Mechanisms in Positive Budget Case
In this section, we present proposed mechanisms: Non-truthful budget constraint
(NoTBC) mechanism motivated by (Khuller et al. 1999) and Truthful budget
constraint (TBC) mechanism motivated by (Singer 2012, 2010).
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4.2.1. NoTBC mechanism
It is a two pass mechanism consisting of Non-truthful budget constraint leader
identification (NoTBC-LI) mechanism and Non-truthful budget constraint doctor
selection (NoTBC-DS) mechanism.




(1) Pick the doctor with the highest marginal contribution per cost value.
(2) Next, the check is made whether the cost for being an initial adapter of the
doctor under consideration is less than or equal to the hospital’s available
budget or not. If yes, then he/she will be selected as the leader, otherwise
not.
(3) Maintain the set of doctors aware about the hiring concept and reduce the
hospital’s available budget by the cost of the doctor selected as the leader.
(4) Remove the doctor selected as the leader from the doctor list.
(5) Follow step 1-4 until the doctor list become empty.
(6) Next, the payment of the selected doctors will be their revealed cost for being
an initial adapter.
Doctors Selection Phase:
(1) Pick the doctor with highest quality contribution per cost value.
(2) Next, if the cost of consultancy of the doctor under consideration is less than
or equal to the patient’s available budget, then he/she will be selected for
the consultancy purpose, otherwise not.
(3) Reduce the patient’s available budget by the cost of consultancy of the se-
lected doctor.
(4) Remove the doctor from the doctors list.
(5) Follow step 1-4 until the doctor set becomes empty.
(6) Next, the payment of the selected doctors will be their revealed cost of
consultancy.
4.2.1.2. Detailed NoTBC mechanism. It is a two pass mechanism consisting of Non-
truthful budget constraint leader identification (NoTBC-LI) mechanism and Non-
truthful budget constraint doctor selection (NoTBC-DS) mechanism.
NoTBC-LI mechanism In each iteration of while loop, a doctor with maximum
marginal contribution per cost among the available doctors is considered and is se-
lected only if its cost for being an initial adapter is less than the hospital’s available
budget. The payment of each doctors as a leader is their revealed cost.
NoTBC-DS Mechanism In each iteration of while loop, a doctor with maximum qual-
ity contribution per cost among the selected doctors by NoTBC-LI mechanism is
considered and is hired only if its cost for the consultancy is less than the patient’s
available budget. The payment of each hired doctors is their revealed cost of consul-
tancy.
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Algorithm 8: NoTBC-LI mechanism (G, S, B, C)
Output: Ŝ ← φ, PΓ ← φ
1 S̄ ← φ // Set containing all the informed doctors.
2 while S 6= φ do




4 if ci ≤ B then
5 Γ ← Γ ∪ {si}; S̄ ← S̄ ∪ {χi}; B ← B − ci
6 end
7 S ← S \ {si}
8 end
9 Ŝ = Γ ∪ S̄
10 for each si ∈ Γ do
11 PΓi ← ci; PΓ ← PΓ ∪ {PΓi}
12 end
13 return Ŝ, PΓ
Algorithm 9: NoTBC-DS mechanism (Ŝ, B′, C̄)
Output: Υ ← φ, P̂ ← φ
1 while Ŝ 6= φ do
2 si ← argmaxj∈Ŝ
Dj(Υj−1)
c̄j
3 if c̄i ≤ B′ then
4 Υ ← Υ ∪ {si}; B′ ← B′ − c̄i
5 end
6 Ŝ ← Ŝ \ {si}
7 end
8 for each si ∈ Υ do
9 P̂ i ← c̄i; P̂ ← P̂ ∪ {P̂ i}
10 end
11 return Υ , P̂
Example 5: Figure 8(a) show the initial configuration of the social graph along with
cost distribution, and marginal contribution (m.c.). The quality vector of the nodes
is given as: Q = {5, 1, 3, 5, 4, 5}. Higher the value, higher will be the quality. For
understanding purpose we are taking the quality of the doctors as an integer value
but in general it may not be the case. It is to be noted that the unit of cost and
budget is taken as $. We have considered hospital’s budget to be 5. Using line 3 of the
Algorithm 8 the node 4 is considered. The condition 2 ≤ 5 for node 4 is satisfied. So,
Γ = {4} and S̄ = {3, 5, 6} as shown in Figure 8(b). Next, node 3 will be considered
and 2.5 ≤ 3 for node 3 is satisfied. So, Γ = {4, 3} and S̄ = {3, 5, 6, 1, 2, 4} as
shown in Figure 8(c). So, we have Ŝ = {3, 5, 6, 1, 2, 4}. The payment of node 3 and
node 4 are 2.5 and 2 respectively as shown in Figure 8(d). The total payment made to
doctors = 4.5 ≤ 5 (hospital’s budget).
We have considered patient’s budget to be 6. Using line 3 of Algorithm 9 Node 1 is
considered and selected as 2 ≤ 6 condition is satisfied. Next, Node 4 will be considered
and 2 ≤ 4 for node 4 is satisfied. Next, Node 6 will be considered and 4 ≤ 2 for node
6 not satisfied. Next, node 3 will be considered and 2.5 ≤ 2 for node 3 is not satisfied.
Next, node 2 will be considered and 1 ≤ 2 for node 2 is satisfied. Next, no node will
be selected as cost of the remaining nodes is higher than remaining budget i.e 1. So,
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Γ = {1, 4, 2}. The payment made to node 1, node 2, and node 4 is 2, 1, and 2. Total
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0 0 0 0 0 0
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(d) Payment determination
Figure 8. Working example of NoTBC mehanism
Lemma 1. The NoTBC mechanism is computationally efficient.
Proof. In NoTBC-LI, for m iteration of while loop we have O(m2). Thus, the running
time of NoTBC-LI is O(m2). In NoTBC-DS, for m iteration (in worst case) of while
loop we have O(m2). Thus, the running time of NoTBC-DS is O(m2). In both the cases,
the payment determination will be linear in m. Thus, the computational complexity of
NoTBC is given as O(m2).
Lemma 2. The NoTBC mechanism is individually rational.
Proof. From line 11 of Algorithm 8, we can see PΓi = ci for each si ∈ Γ . Line 9 in
Algorithm 9 shows that P̂ i = c̄i. Therefore, we have payment for any winner is its
cost. Hence, NoTBC mechanism is individually rational.
Lemma 3. The NoTBC mechanism is budget feasible.
Proof. As it is clear that a doctor is included in the winning set only when the given
condition in line 4 of Algorithm 8 and line 3 of Algorithm 9 is satisfied. As the payment
in case of NoTBC is equal to the cost; the total payment will be at most the budget.
Hence, NoTBC mechanism is budget feasible.
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4.2.2. TBC Mechanism
It is a two pass mechanism consists of Truthful budget constraint leader identification
(TBC-LI) and Truthful budget constraint doctor selection (TBC-DS) mechanisms.
4.2.2.1. Outline of TBC mechanism. The idea of the TBC mechanism is presented.
TBC mechanism
Doctors Influencing Phase:
(1) Each time consider a doctor i with maximum marginal contribution per cost
among the available doctors. But, the doctor i will be selected as the leader






(2) Payment rule: Drag the agent i outside the market and repeat step 1. De-
termine the largest index ` in the sorting of Γ ′ doctors (determined without
si) that satisfies the condition in step 1.





:Maximal cost that doctor si can declare in order
to be allocated instead of doctor in the jth place in the sorting.




I(Γ ′j−1∪{si}) : Threshold payment.




(1) Doctors are sorted based on Di(Υi−1)c̄i for all si ∈ Ŝ.
(2) Greedily consider the doctor from the sorted list (in decreasing order), but













4.2.2.2. Detailed TBC Mechanism. For first fold of hiring problem, we propose a
TBC-LI mechanism motivated by (Singer 2012, 2010).
Allocation rule In this, a doctor with maximum marginal contribution per cost among
the available doctors is considered. But the doctor is selected as the leader only when
the ratio between their cost as the initial adapter and budget is less than or equal to half
Algorithm 10: TBC-LI allocation mechanism (G, S, B, C)
Output: Γ ← φ, Ŝ ← φ










3 Γ ← Γ ∪ {si}; S̄ ← S̄ ∪ {χi}





6 Ŝ = Γ ∪ S̄
7 return Γ and Ŝ
of the ratio between their marginal contribution and the value of the selected subset.
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Example 6: Figure 9(a) show the initial configuration of the social graph along with
cost distribution, and marginal contribution (m.c.). The quality vector of the nodes
is given as: Q = {5, 1, 3, 5, 4, 5}. Higher the value, higher will be the quality. For
understanding purpose we are taking the quality of the doctors as an integer value
but in general it may not be the case. It is to be noted that the unit of cost and
budget is taken as $. We have considered hospital’s budget to be 10. Using line 1 of
the Algorithm 10 the node 4 is considered. The condition 2 ≤ 5· ( 33+0) for node
4 is satisfied. So, Γ = {4} and S̄ = {3, 5, 6}. Next, node 3 will be considered and
2.5 ≤ 5· ( 33+3) for node 3 is satisfied. So, Γ = {4, 3} and S̄ = {3, 5, 6, 1, 2, 4}. So,
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(b) Intermediate configuration
Figure 9. Detailed functioning of Algorithm 10
Payment rule The payment rule is motivated by (Singer 2010).
Algorithm 11: TBC-LI pricing mechanism (Γ , B, C)
Output: PΓ ← φ
1 Γ ′ ← φ, S ′ ← φ
2 for each si ∈ Γ do
3 S ′ ← S \ {si}







5 while cj ≤ B
( MCj (Γ ′j−1)
MCj (Γ ′j−1)+I(Γ ′j−1)
)
do
6 Γ ′ ← Γ ′ ∪ {sj} // Γ ′ is the set of leaders when si is not in the
market.
7 S ′ ← S ′ \ {sj}








10 Γ ′ ← Γ ′ ∪ {sj} for each sj ∈ Γ ′ do











13 PΓi ← maxj∈[1..`+1]{min{Cji ,Π
j
i}}; PΓ ← PΓ ∪ {PΓi}
14 end
15 return PΓ
In this, for each doctor si ∈ Γ consider running line 3 − 9. Next, determine the
largest index ` in the sorting of |Γ ′| doctors (determined without si) such that the
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ratio between their cost as the initial adapter and budget is less than or equal to the
ratio between their marginal contribution and the value of the selected subset. Now









that doctor si can declare in order to be allocated instead of the doctor in the jth
place in the sorting; where MjCi(Γ
′
j−1) is the marginal contribution of doctor si when
considered on jth place is given as: MjCi(Γ
′
j−1) = I(Γ ′j−1∪{si})−I(Γ ′j−1). Now, if this




I(Γ ′j−1∪{si}) then the mechanism
will declare si as the leader. Considering the maximum of the values at j ∈ [1. . `+ 1]
results in the payment of si.
Example 7: Figure 10 shows the payment calculation of node 4. So, placing node 4
outside the market and utilizing line 3−9 of Algorithm 11 on the configurations shown
in Figure 10(a), Figure 10(b), and Figure 10(c) we find the critical point as ` = 2 (index
of node 3). Following Figure 10(d) at point 1 (index of node 2) the value C14 = 3·(11) = 3,
and Π14 = 10 · (33) = 10. So, min{3, 10} = 3. Similarly, at point 2 (index of node 3)
the value C24 = 2 · (2.52 ) = 2.5, and Π24 = 10 · (23) = 6.66. So, min{2.5, 6.66} = 2.5.
Considering point 3 (index of the first loser node i.e node 6) we get C34 = 2·(41) = 8, and

















































min{3, 10}min{2.5, 203 }min{8, 4}
62 3
max{3, 2.5, 4} = 4
Payment of node 4 = 4
(d) Payment determination
Figure 10. Payment calculation of node 4
4.2.3. TBC-DS Mechanism
For the second fold of the doctors hiring problem, we propose a TBC-DS mechanism
motivated by (Singer 2012, 2010).
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Allocation rule In this, firstly the available doctors are sorted in decreasing order
based on quality contribution by cost. Now, the doctors are greedily selected but
will be hired only when the ratio of the selected doctor’s cost of consultation and
the patient’s budget is less than or equal to the ratio between the quality contri-
bution by the selected doctor and the value of the quality of the selected subset.
Algorithm 12: TBC-DS allocation mechanism (Ŝ, B′, C̄)
Output: Υ ← φ
1 . Sort(Ŝ) // Sorting based on Di(Υi−1)
c̄i
for all si ∈ Ŝ
2 for each si ∈ Ŝ do










Example 8: Considering the set-up shown in Figure 9(a). We have utilized the same
cost vector as given in Figure 6. The patient’s budget is given as 8. The quality vector
is given as Q = {5, 1, 3, 5, 4, 5}. The set of nodes informed by the leaders {4, 3}
is given as {3, 5, 6, 4, 1, 2}. So, the nodes 3, 5, 6, 4, 1, and 2 are sorted based on
quality contribution per cost and is given as: {1, 4, 6, 3, 2, 5}. First node 1 is considered
and the condition 2 ≤ 8· (55) for node 1 is satisfied. So, Υ = {1}. Next, node 4 will be
considered and the condition 2 ≤ 8· ( 510) for node 4 is satisfied. So, Υ = {1, 4}.
Payment rule The Payment rule is motivated by (Singer 2010). For each si, it is
defined as the minimum of the doctor’s proportional share and the threshold payment.
` is the largest index that satisfies the condition in line 2 of Algorithm refalgo:10.
Algorithm 13: TBC-DS Pricing Mechanism (Υ , B′, C̄)
Output: P̂ ← φ
1 for each si ∈ Υ do






; P̂ ← P̂ ∪ P̂ i
3 end
4 return P̂
















Lemma 4. The TBC mechanism is computationally efficient.
Proof. In TBC-LI, line 1−5 of Algorithm 10 is bounded above by m. In Algorithm 11,
for each iteration of for loop line 3−14 is bounded above by m. As we have m iterations
in worst case, we have O(m2). Thus, the running time of TBC-LI mechanism is O(m2).
In TBC-DS, line 1 of Algorithm 12 takes O(m lgm) time. Line 2− 6 takes O(m) time.
So, overall running time of Algorithm 12 is O(m lgm) + O(m) = O(m lgm). Line
1 − 3 of Algorithm 13 takes time O(m). Thus, running time of TBC-DS mechanism
is O(m lgm). The computational complexity of TBC mechanism is given as O(m2) +
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O(m lgm) = O(m2).
4.3. More General Setting
Till now, for simplicity purpose we have considered the set-up, where there is one
patient having publicly known positive budget B′ admitted to a hospital and multiple
doctors say m given as S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm}. The goal is to allocate as many doctors as
possible to a patient, so that the total payment made to the doctors is within patient’s
budget B′. But, one can think of the situation where there are multiple patients say
k given as P = {p1, p2, . . . , pk} may be admitted to k different hospitals and multiple
doctors say m. Each of the patient pi has a budget B′i which is public information. Also,
each of the hospital report the consultancy time for the respective patient. Similar to
the previous set-up, in this set-up it is assumed that the doctors are unaware about
the hiring concept. In this model, the participating hospitals individual budget will be
accumulated resulting in total budget say B and will be utilized for the purpose of
informing the substantial number of experts about the hiring concept. However, the
source of each hospital’s budget is similar to the previous scenario of case 2. Each of
the doctor has the set of availability times for providing the consultancy. The goal is
to allocate each patient pi ∈ P as many doctors as possible so that the total payment
made to the hired doctors are within patients budget B′i. Rest of the parameters for
the general setting is similar to the previously discussed scenario in case 2.
For this setting, a mechanism is proposed for the second fold of the experts
hiring problem named as Mechanism for doctors selection in general setting (MDS-
GS). It is to be noted that, the mechanism for the first fold will be similar to the
previous scenario of case 2.
4.3.1. Outline of MDS-GS
In this section, the underlying idea of the MDS-GS is presented.
MDS-GS
• Based on the reported availability time and consultancy time for consul-
tancy, partition the agents set into two time slots i.e. Morning slot
(MS) and Evening slot (ES).
• In each time slot, assign a distinct random number to each of the available
patients.
• Next, each of the patient is considered sequentially and the mechanisms
proposed for the single patient setting, are executed for the two slots.
• Remove the set of experts allocated to a patient in current iteration from
the consultancy arena.
• Iterate, until all the patients are considered.
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4.3.2. Detailed MDS-GS
The input to the MDS-GS are: the set of n informed set of doctors i.e. Ŝ, the set
of k available patients i.e. P . In line 1, the variable ` is initialized to 0. In line 2
the slot data structure holds the available slots i.e. MS and ES. In line 3 the agents
are partitioned in morning slot (MS) and Evening slot (ES) based on their reported
availability time and consultancy time. For each slot, using line 5 − 15 the random
numbers are generated and is assigned to each of the patients. In line 16, the pa-
tients present in each of the jth slot is sorted based on the random number assigned.
Line 17-22 executes the Algorithm 9, Algorithm 12, and Algorithm 13 for each of
the patients in each time slot and each time deletes the doctors already allocated.
Algorithm 14: MDS-GS (Ŝ, P)
1 ` ← 0
2 Slot = {MS, ES}
3 Based on the reported availability time and consultancy time for consultancy,
partition the agents into MS and ES.
4 for each j ∈ Slot do
5 for i = 1 to |j ·P | // |j ·P| is the number of patients in jth slot.
6 do
7 R ← R∪ {i}
8 end
9 for i = 1 to |j ·P | do
10 swap R[i] with R[Random(i, len(j))]
11 end
12 for each pi ∈ j do
13 Assign(pi,R[`])
14 `← `+ 1
15 end
16 Pj ← Sort(Pj) // Sort Pj based on random number assigned; Pj is the
patient set in jth slot.
17 for each pi ∈ Pj do
18 Execute Algorithm 9 // For non-truthful mechanism.
19 Remove allocated set of doctors by Algorithm 9 from slot j
20 Execute Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 13 // For truthful mechanism.
21 Remove the allocated set of doctors by Algorithm 12 from slot j
22 end
23 end
4.3.3. Upper Bound Analysis
The random number generator in line 5-15 is motivated by (Cormen et al. 2009) and
is bounded above by k. The outer for loop in line 4− 23 will executed for 2 times and
is bounded above by O(1). In line 16, the sorting is done that is bounded above by


































































































4.4. Analysis of Proposed Mechanisms
Lemma 5. In TBC-LI, the total payment made to the doctors are within hospital’s
budget B.
Proof. The proof is motivated by (Singer 2012). As the maximum payment that any
winning EC i can be paid is Πki =
B·MCk (Γi−1)
I(Γi−1∪{i}) . The total payment of the ECs as






















I(Γi−1 ∪ {si})︸ ︷︷ ︸
Informed ECs
by set Γi













− I(Γi−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Informed ECs
by set Γi−1
⇒ T PI ≤ B
Hence, it is proved that the incentive compatible total payment do not exceed the
budget. This holds true for the general setting.
Lemma 6. In TBC-LI mechanism, if any doctor si comes ahead of its current position















Proof. If the EC i by reporting ci′ moves at position i′ such that i′ < i as depicted in
Figure 11 below:
i′ − 1 i′ i− 1 i
ci′ cici−1ci′−1
Figure 11. Pictorial representation
From the definition of I(·) we can say: I(Γi′−1) < I(Γi−1). As the set Γi′−1 is smaller
as compared to the set Γi−1, so from the definition of the monotone sub-modular
marginal contribution property, it can be said:
MCi′ (Γi′−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal contribution
of i′ given Γi′−1
> MCi(Γi−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal contribution
of i given Γi−1
(1)
The number of ECs leaders by the set Γi′ will be less than the number of ECs leaders
by Γi. Mathematically,
MCi′ (Γi′−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal contribution
of i′ given Γi′−1
+I(Γi′−1) < MCi(Γi−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal contribution
of i given Γi−1
+I(Γi−1)
1



















Hence, it is proved.
Theorem 6. TBC-LI mechanism is monotone.
Proof. Fix i, c−i, ci, and ci′ . For mechanism TBC-LI mechanism to be monotone,
we need to show that, any winning EC i with private cost ci will still be considered in
the winning set of ECs when declaring ci′ such that ci′ < ci or any losing EC i with
private cost ci will still be considered in the losing set of ECs when declaring ci′ such
that ci′ > ci. The proof is divided into two cases.
Case 1: In this case, the ith winning EC deviates and reveals a cost of consultation
ci′ < ci. Again two cases can happen. If the EC i shows a small deviation in his/her
(henceforth his) cost ci i.e. ci′ such that ci′ < ci and the current position of the EC i
remains unchanged. In this situation, it can still be considered in the winning set. It
is to be noted that, if the EC i reports a large deviation in his cost ci i.e. ci′ such that







≥ . . . ≥ MCn(Γn−1)
cn
EC i will be placed some position ahead (say i′) of its current position say i i.e. i′ < i.
This scenario is depicted in Figure 12 below.
33
i′ − 1 i′ i− 1 i
ci′ cici−1ci′−1
Figure 12. Pictorial representation
From Lemma 6 it can be said that if EC i is placed some position ahead by revealing
a cost ci′ < ci then it must satisfy
MCi′ (Γi′−1)





Let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that, when the EC i ∈ S comes ahead
in ordering say at some position i′ such that ci′ < ci, then it is not considered in the
winning set of the EC because it is not satisfying the given budget. If this is the case,






MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I(Γi′−1)
)
(4)





MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I(Γi′−1)
)
< ci′ < ci (5)
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So, it is a contradiction.
Case 2: In this case, the ith losing EC deviates and reveals a cost of consultation ci′
> ci. Again two cases can happen. If the EC i shows a small deviation in his/her
(henceforth his) cost ci i.e. ci′ such that ci′ > ci and the current position of the EC i
remains unchanged. In this situation, it will be considered in the losing set. It is to be
noted that, if the EC i reports a large deviation in his cost ci i.e. ci′ such that ci′ > ci,







≥ . . . ≥ MCn(Γn−1)
cn
EC i will be placed some position ahead (say i′) of its current position say i i.e. i′ > i.
This scenario is depicted in Figure 13 below.
i− 1 i i′ − 1 i′
ci ci′ci′−1ci−1
Figure 13. Pictorial representation
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Analogous to the statement given in Lemma 6 it can be said that if EC i is placed
some position ahead by revealing a cost ci′ > ci then it must satisfy
MCi′ (Γi′−1)





Let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that, when the EC i ∈ S comes ahead
in ordering say at some position i′ such that c′i > ci, then it is not considered in the
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> ci′ > ci (8)
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So, it is a contradiction.
Hence, the theorem is proved.
Theorem 7. In TBC-DS, the function D : 2S ⇒ R≥0 is:
(a) monotone: If S ⊆ F then D(S) ≤ D(F), and
(b) submodular: If D(S ∪ {i})−D(S) ≥ D(F ∪ {i})−D(F) ∀S ⊆ F .
Proof. To prove that the function is indeed monotone, let us suppose for the sake
of contradiction that, if S ⊆ F then D(S) > D(F). From the definition of quality
function, we can say D(S) > D(F)=∑i∈S Qi >∑i∈F Qi. It is to be noted that under
the given condition S ⊆ F , the sum of all the Q′is over the set F will be greater than




i∈F Qi. So, the inequality
D(S) > D(F) = ∑i∈S Qi > ∑i∈F Qi cannot be true. Our assumption contradicts.
Hence, the inequality if S ⊆ F then D(S) ≤ D(F) holds and the given function is
monotone.
To prove that the function is submodular, as a thought experiment one can say that
adding the same quantity i.e. in this case the quality value of any agent si to the sets
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having relation S ⊆ F will reflect the contribution by any agent si more in S than in
F . This completes the proof.
Theorem 8. TBC-LI is truthful.
Proof. Fix EC j, c−j , cj , and cj′ . For TBC-LI mechanism to be truthful, we need to
show that, it is not beneficial for any EC j to underbid or overbid say cj′ such that
cj′ < cj or cj′ > cj respectively.
1 2 i j
c1 c2 ci cj
k
1 2 i j










Figure 14. Pictorial representation
For each of the above possible scenarios, the proof is divided into two cases. Before
going into the different cases let’s consider the case where the EC j is reporting his
true cost cj . The pictorial representation of the possible set-up with n ECs are shown
in Figure 14. The values from 1 to n represents the position (or index). Currently, our
analysis lies around the index k and k + 1; where k denote the index of the last EC `
that respects the allocation condition given in line 2 of Algorithm 10. As the ECs are






MCj (Γi−1) · ci
MCi(Γi−1)
(9)
By using line 12 of algorithm 11 and equation 9 it can be easily seen that, cj ≥ Cij . If
this is the case then we can say cj ≥ Πij . In order to be allocated EC j must satisfy
Cij ≤ Πij otherwise Cij > Πij means not allocated. As we are taking the payment as:
• If Cij = Πij ⇒ PΓj = min{Cij ,Πij} = Πij = Cij ≤ cj
• If Cij > Πij ⇒ PΓj = min{Cij ,Πij} = Πij = Πij ≤ cj
• If Cij < Πij ⇒ PΓj = min{Cij ,Πij} = Cij ≤ cj
If this is the case, then it can be concluded that Cij ≤ cj or Πij ≤ cj . As the payment
is less than the actual cost. Hence not allocated. Coming back to our underbid and
overbid cases.
Scenario 1: Underbidding (cj′ < cj) In this case, the jth EC deviates and reveals a
cost of consultation cj′ < cj . This scenario give rise to two cases.
Case 1:When EC j is in losing set. If the EC j shows a small deviation in his/her
(henceforth his) cost i.e. cj′ such
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Figure 15. Pictorial representation
that cj′ < cj and the current position of the EC j remains unchanged. In this
situation, it can still be considered in the losing set. It is to be noted that, if the EC
j reports a large deviation in his cost cj i.e. cj′ in this case it will belong to winning
set and will appear before EC i as shown in Figure 15. As the ECs are sorted based











= Cij because from above we have got the relation Cij ≤ cj . This
will lead to cj′ ≤ Cij ≤ cj . The EC j is paid less than the actual cost.
Case 2: When EC j is in winning set. If the EC j shows a deviation in his cost such





























Figure 16. Pictorial representation
















MCj (Γt−1) · ci
MCi(Γi−1)
= Clj
From above two equations it is clear that no matter what cost EC j is bidding, he will
still be winning and be paid an amount Clj . Hence, considering Case 1 and Case 2 it
can be concluded that EC j does not gain by underbidding there true cost. In similar
fashion, we can write the above mentioned equation for any position i before k and in
the same way we can prove that Cij ≤ cj .
Scenario 2: Overbidding (cj′ > cj) In this case, the jth EC deviates and reveals a
cost of consultation cj′ > cj . This scenario gives rise to two cases.
Case 1: When EC j is in losing set. If the EC j shows a small deviation in his/her
(henceforth his) cost i.e. cj′ such that cj′ > cj and the current position of the EC j
remains unchanged. In this situation, it can still be considered in the losing set.
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Figure 17. Pictorial representation
It is to be noted that, if the EC j reports a large deviation in his cost cj i.e. cj′ in
this case it will belong to losing set and will still appear after EC i as shown in Figure











= Cij . From above we have got the relation Cij ≤ cj . This will
lead to cj′ ≤ Cij ≤ cj . The EC j is paid less than the actual cost.
Case 2: When EC j is in winning set. If the EC j shows a deviation in his cost such
that cj′ > cj and the current position of the EC j remains unchanged. In this situation,
it can still be considered in the winning set. It is to be noted that, if the EC j reports
a large deviation in his cost cj i.e. cj′ in this case it will belong to losing set and
will appear after EC i as shown in Figure 18. Utilizing the definition of the marginal
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MCi(Γi−1)
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MCj (Γt−1) · ci
MCi(Γi−1)
= Clj
Now, if EC j deviates by large amount then it will belong to the losing set. From above
two equations it is clear that no matter what cost EC j is bidding, he will be paid Clj .
Hence, considering Case 1 and Case 2 it can be concluded that EC j does not gain
by overbidding there true cost. In similar fashion, we can write the above mentioned
equation for any position i before k and in the same way we can prove that Cij ≤ cj .
Hence, max operator will still endure that if any agent j deviates and wins, then his


























(with EC j, reporting truthfully)
(with EC j, misreporting)
(without EC j)
Figure 18. Pictorial representation
Hence, the theorem is proved.
5. Experimental Findings
In this section, we compare the efficacy of the proposed mechanisms via simulations.
For the zero budget case, the experiments are carried out in this section to provide a
simulation based on the data (the strict preference ordering of the patients) generated
randomly using the Random library in Python. Our proposed naive mechanism i.e.
RanPAM is considered as a benchmark scheme and is compared with TOAM (in case
of full preferences) and TOAM-IComP (in case of incomplete preferences).
For the positive budget case, we have compared our proposed mechanisms against
the benchmark mechanism (random mechanism). In this, the doctors are selected
randomly and are paid their declared cost. We have utilized the coverage model for the
first fold of our hiring problem. The unit of cost and budget is $. The experiments are
performed for the single patient-multiple experts scenario. Similar graphical behaviour
can be seen for multiple patient-multiple doctor scenario.
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5.1. Simulation Set-Up
Case 1: For creating a real world healthcare scenario we have considered 10 different
categories of patients and doctors for our simulation purpose. It is to be noted that, in
each of the categories, some fixed number of patients and fixed number of doctors are
present for taking consultancy and for providing consultancy respectively. One of the
scenario that is taken into consideration for simulation purpose is, say there are equal
number of patients and doctors present in each of the categories under consideration
along with the assumption that each of the patients are providing strict preference or-
dering (generated randomly) over all the available doctors in the respective categories.
This scenario is referred as Scenario-1 in the rest of the paper. Next, the more general
scenario with equal number of patients and doctors in each of the categories can be
obtained by relaxing the constraint that all the available patients are providing the
strict preference ordering over all the available doctors in categories under considera-
tion. Here, it may be the case that, in each of the categories the patients are providing
the strict preference ordering over the subset of the available doctors. This scenario is
referred as Scenario-2 in the rest of the paper.
In the series of different scenarios, next we have considered the utmost general set-up
where there are n number of patients and m number of doctors such that m 6= n
(m > n and m < n). In this, the patients are providing the strict preference ordering
over the subset of the available doctors in each categories under consideration. The
scenario with m > n is referred as scenario-3 and the scenario with m < n is referred
as scenario-4 in the future references.
Case 2: For our simulation purpose, a social graph is generated randomly using Net-
workx package of python. It consists of 1000 nodes (doctors) and approximately
28,250 edges. The maximum and minimum degree a node can have is 10% and 1%
of the total available nodes respectively. The cost of each node as initial adapter is uni-
formly distributed over [30, 50], the cost of consultancy is uniformly distributed over
[35, 50], and quality is uniformly distributed over [20, 50]. The budget is considered in
range [100, 1000].
5.2. Performance Metrics
Case 1: The performance of the proposed mechanisms is measured under the banner
of two important parameters:
• Efficiency loss (EL). It is the sum of the difference between the index of the doctor
allocated from the agent preference list to the index of the most preferred doctor
by the agent from his preference list. Mathematically, the EL is defined as: EL =∑n
i=1(IiA − IiMP ) where, IiA is the index of the doctor allocated from the initially
provided preference list of the patient i, IiMP is the index of the most preferred doctor
in the initially provided preference list of patient i. Considering the overall available







(IiA − IiMP ) (10)
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• Number of best allocation (NBA). It measures the number of patients (say k) gets
their best choice (most preferred doctor) from their provided preference list over the
available number of doctors. It is the sum of the number of agents getting their most
preferred doctor from their provided preference list.
Case 2: The performance metric includes the Interested doctors set size,
and Number of doctors hired.
5.3. Simulation Directions
Considering case 1, as the benchmark scheme is vulnerable to manipulation, the
two direction are seen for measuring the performance of RanPAM, TOAM, and
TOAM-IComP. The two directions are:
• When all the agents (patients) are reporting their true preference list.
• When some of the agents (patients) are misreporting their true preference list.
5.4. Analysis of Results
Case 1: In this section, the result is simulated following the directions mentioned in
Subsection 5.3. As the patients are varying their true preference list, the next question
that comes is that, how many of the patients can vary their true preference list (i.e.
what fraction of the total available patients can vary their true preference list?). To
answer this question, the calculation is done using indicator random variable.
−Expected amount of variation The following analysis mathematically justifies the
idea of choosing the parameters of variation. The analysis is motivated by (Cormen
et al. 2009). Let Ni be the random variable associated with the event in which ith
patient varies his true preference ordering. Thus, Ni = {ith patient varies preference
ordering}. We have, from the definition of expectation that E[Ni] = Pr{ith patient
varies preference ordering}. Let N be the random variable denoting the total number
of patients vary their preference ordering. By using the properties of random variable,
it can be written that N = ∑ni=1Ni. We wish to compute the expected number of
variations, and so we take the expectation both sides and by linearity of expectation
we can write E[N ] = ∑ni=1E[Ni] = ∑ni=1(Pr{ith patient varies preference ordering})
=
∑n
i=1 1/8 = n/8. Here, Pr{ith patient varies preference ordering} is the probability
that given a patient whether he will vary his true preference ordering. The probability
of that is taken as 1/8 (small variation). If the number of agents varies from 1/4 and
1/2, then the expected number of patient that may vary their preference ordering can
be n/4 (medium variation), and n/2 (large variation) respectively.
In Figure 19(a) and Figure 19(b)-19(d), it can be seen that the total efficiency
loss of the system in case of RanPAM is more than the total efficiency loss of the
system in case of TOAM and TOAM-IComP respectively. This is due to the fact that,
dissimilar to the RanPAM, TOAM and TOAM-IComP allocates the best possible
doctors to the patients from their revealed preference list. Due to this reason, the
value returned by equation 10 in case of TOAM and TOAM-IComP is very small as
compared to RanPAM. In Figure 19(a), when the agents are varying (misreporting)
their true preference ordering, then the TEL of the patients in case of TOAM with
large variation (TOAM L-var) is more than the TEL in TOAM with medium variation
(TOAM M-var) is more than the TEL in TOAM with small variation (TOAM S-var) is
more than the TEL in TOAM without variation. As it is natural from the construction
of the TOAM. Considering the case of incomplete preferences in Figure 19(b)-19(d),
when the subset of agents are varying their true preference ordering, then the TEL of
41
the patients in case of TOAM-IComP with large variation (TOAM-IComP L-var) is
more than the TEL in TOAM-IComP with medium variation (TOAM-IComP M-var)
is more than the TEL in TOAM-IComP with small variation (TOAM-IComP S-var)
is more than the TEL in TOAM-IComP without variation. As this is evident from the







































































































































(d) Total Efficiency Loss (Scenario 4)
Figure 19. Total efficiency loss for different scenarios
Considering the case of our second parameter i.e NBA, in Figure 20(a) and Figure
20(b)-20(d), it can be seen that the NBA of the system in case of RanPAM is less than
the NBA of the system in case of TOAM and TOAM-IComP respectively. This is due
to the fact that, dissimilar to the RanPAM, TOAM and TOAM-IComP allocates the
best possible doctors to the patients from their preference list. In Figure 20(a), when
the agents are varying their true preference ordering, then the NBA of the patients
in case of TOAM with large variation (TOAM L-var) is less than the NBA in TOAM
with medium variation (TOAM M-var) is less than the NBA in TOAM with small
variation (TOAM S-var) is less than the NBA in TOAM without variation. As it is
natural from the construction of the TOAM.
In Figure 20(b)-20(d), when the subset of agents are varying their true preference
ordering, then the NBA of the patients in case of TOAM-IComP with large variation
(TOAM-IComP L-var) is less than the NBA in TOAM-IComP with medium variation
(TOAM-IComP M-var) is less than the NBA in TOAM-IComP with small variation
(TOAM-IComP S-var) is less than the TEL in TOAM-IComP without variation. As























































































































































(d) Total Number of Best Allocation (Scenario 4)
Figure 20. Number of best allocation for different scenarios
Case 2: The simulation results shown in Figure 21(a) shows the comparison of the
interested doctors set size i.e. the number of doctors acting as leaders and the number


















































(b) Hired doctors with budget
Figure 21. Simulation results for positive budget case
It is seen in Figure 21(a) that the interested doctors set size in case of NoTBC
mechanism is higher than TBC mechanism and random mechanism. This nature of
NoTBC mechanism is obvious due to the fact that the mechanisms (NoTBC-LI and
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NoTBC-DS) are utilizing almost the complete quota of the available budgets whereas
TBC mechanism is utilizing only a part of total budget. With the increase in budget,
one can easily see the increasing gap between NoTBC mechanism and TBC mechanism.
It can be seen evidently in Figure 21(b) that the number of doctors hired in case of
NoTBC mechanism is higher than TBC mechanism and random mechanism. Similar
reasoning can be given as above.
6. Realistic Implementation of Our Proposed Frameworks
In our country, several free medical camps are organized under the banners of “Smile
on Wheels” (Smile 2017), “UPPAHAR” (Uppahar 2009), and several others on regular
basis for health check ups, cataract surgeries, etc. In such type of existing system, there
may exist a team of well known ophthalmologist, physicians, dentists, dermatologists
and general physicians etc. In this, the expertise that are provided by the participating
experts are mainly free of cost. Currently, the general practice in such existing system
is that, irrespective of patients choice, doctors having speciality in certain domain are
assigned randomly to the patient in an adhoc fashion. However, the existing system
could be more structured if our developed framework is deployed in such scenarios.
Also, deploying our framework to such existing system will lead to the allocation of
favourable doctors among the available experts and not the random one, that will im-
prove the quality of the healthcare service and also help in increasing the satisfaction
level of patients in terms of healthcare services.
In our country, there are some hospitals that provide the comprehensive healthcare
services to the unreached community free of cost. Among them, one of the hospitals
is K G hospital, Coimbatore, India run by K. Govindaswamy Naidu Medical Trust.
Talking about this hospital, it has 250 doctors, and 800 fully trained and experienced
nurses and para-medical staff for providing the free medical services to the needy ones.
At the time of writing this paper, they have already served around 85,000 free cataract
surgeries, 200 free heart surgeries, 1,500 dialysis free of cost, screened over 300,000 peo-
ple free of cost for blood pressure and saved 35,000 accident victims (Hospital 2018).
Also, they have provided their services to the victims of several natural and man-made
calamities such as Kargil war, Gujrat earthquake, and Tsunami (Hospital 2018).
As mentioned above, there motivation behind implementation of our proposed frame-
work lies in the fact that other than in-house experts they will be empowered by some
high profile experts present around the globe. This will lead to a two-fold gain a) im-
proved healthcare facility and b) the projection of their identity at the global market.
7. Conclusions and Future Directions
In literature, several works have been done focusing on scheduling the healthcare re-
sources (such as OTs, physicians, and nurses) inside the hospitals, in an efficient and
effective manner. In addition to this, very few works have been done in the direction
of scheduling the healthcare resources (especially doctors) outside the in-house hos-
pitals, both in strategic and non-strategic setting. In this paper, we have investigated
the experts hiring problem from outside the hospitals, in strategic setting. Due to the
participation of strategic agents in our proposed healthcare system, the scenarios are
modelled through the robust concepts of mechanism design with and without money.
Here, we have investigated the hiring problem from outside the hospitals in zero bud-
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get and positive budget scenarios. The mechanisms are proposed that satisfies several
economic properties such as truthfulness, core allocation, pareto optimality, and budget
feasibility. Through theoretical and experimental analysis, it has been shown that the
proposed mechanisms in case of zero budget i.e. TOAM and TOAM-ICoMP are truth-
ful, pareto optimal and satisfies the core property. Also, in positive budget case it has
been shown that TBC-LI mechanism is truthful, monotone, and budget feasible. Talking
about the practical implication of our proposed system, currently, in any healthcare
camp, the general practice is that, irrespective of the patients choice, doctors having
speciality in certain domain are assigned randomly in an adhoc fashion. However, the
existing system could be more structured if our developed framework is deployed in
such scenarios. Also, deploying our framework to such existing system will lead to the
allocation of favourable doctors among the available experts and not the random one,
that will improve the quality of the healthcare service and also help in increasing the
satisfaction level of patients in terms of healthcare services.
One of the future works in zero budget environment could be, the setting with n
patients and m doctors (m 6= n or m == n) where the members of the two participat-
ing communities, namely the patients and the doctors will be revealing the preference
ordering not necessarily in strict sense over the members of the opposite community
for a stipulated amount of time. In case of positive budget environment, one can think
of investigating the experts hiring problem in combinatorial domain. In this set-up, we
will have multiple patients and multiple experts, where each patient has a privilege
to report the preferred set of experts they are interested in, among the available one
along with their valuation.
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